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1. Introduction
Presumption and Burden of Proof issues play a unique role in argumentation
studies. Particular argumentative methods and techniques may advance or
deter a line of reasoning, but burden and presumption issues decide when a
line of reasoning is needed at all. There is little doubt that burden and
presumption issues are hugely influential in determining the outcome of
conflicts. In law, most burden and presumption issues are typically decided well
before trials proceed and in fact must be decided in order for trials to go
forward. Once the burden and presumption issues are decided, some cases
resolve themselves.
And so being able to shift the burden of proof or change presumption is a
power that seems to be qualitatively different from the power of ordinary
argumentative techniques. For it is a power that shapes the rules whereby
arguments proceed and the standards by which they are evaluated. Other
kinds of arguments take place within the framework established by burden and
presumption. Burden and presumption govern argumentation, make it
possible, limit and define its outcome.
2. The Burden-shifting Society
In many institutionally governed argument fields, burden and presumption
provide relatively stable frameworks for argument. In many cases, no one
attempts to shift burdens and no one attempts to change reigning
presumptions. Where burden and presumption structures remain
unchallenged, one has a great deal of agreement that the issues have been
decided fairly, and so one has a certain stability of institutions and practices.
So it is not surprising that in his book, Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse,
Richard Gaskins finds that in situations of deep uncertainty, in times of doubt
about foundational matters of burden and presumption, burden shifting
becomes a more common technique of argumentation. It is a dream of
argumentation theory to be a theory of sociality, to find social forms to be
determined by the kinds of arguments that are signally persuasive for the
groups in question. Gaskins gives a wonderful example of such an attempt,
finding not only a way to measure social uncertainty by identifying what kinds of
argumentative strategies are taking power, but by actually coming to critical
judgments about a society because of the frequency and the occasions of use
of a strategy.
Douglas Walton has a corrective response to Gaskins' theoretical zealotry. He

points out that the shifting of burden that goes with the argument from
ignorance is not at all simply a fallacy but a very reasonable adaptation to
practical situations of complexity in which fairly quick decisions are needed.
The ability to formulate an argument for a course of action when a course is
required and no one else seems able to formulate an argument is hardly a sign
of cultural decay; it is a sign of a creative and practical mind that has adapted
to a situation.
However, it is not clear that Gaskins and Walton are speaking of exactly the
same thing. It is one thing to use the argument from ignorance in a situation in
which a choice must be made on the basis of the best line of reasoning
available within a very limited amount of time. It is another to resort to burden
shifting that does not require an explicit argument from ignorance. For
example, when Gaskins discusses Kant's antinomies, he is more concerned
with the problem that presumption is entirely vulnerable to being challenged at
any point, even when arguments have been offered on each side. And
timeliness is not an issue in the situation of Kant's antinomies. In addition,
burden issues regard more than simple arguments from ignorance; they also
regard standards such as "beyond reasonable doubt," or "by a preponderance
of evidence." And presumption in law seems to work across the line between
argument from ignorance and burden issues, with presumption in
argumentation in general often taking on an even broader meaning.
I want to shed some light on this unique issue of burden and presumption by
exploring Chaim Perelman's writings on the subject. Perelman agrees with
Walton that there is nothing strictly fallacious about the argument from
ignorance since in the end Perelman doesn't have much tolerance for the
concept of a fallacy at all. There are argumentative techniques and there are
counter-techniques. And, like Walton, he's usually keen on showing the rational
dimension of what many people would call fallacies. However, he also seems
to see what Gaskins sees--the unusually important role that presumption plays
in argumentation. In fact, I believe that Perelman's account of presumption is
enormously subtle, and capable, I think, of explaining what truth there is in
Walton's and Gaskins' approaches to the issue.
3. Gaskins' Attack on The New Rhetoric
Richard Gaskins deploys a critique of Perelman as an important part of the
argument of his book on Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse. His
arguments against Perelman's approach run like this. First, Perelman's theory
is weak because it depends on shifting the burden of proof. This is especially
troubling according to Gaskins because Perelman includes no developed
account of burden-shifting or presumption in his theory. That is, Perelman is
making a move he cannot account for. Further, when Perelman does speak of
presumption, outside of situations in which presumptions are institutionalized,
they are completely up for grabs. Here Gaskins goes for the aorta of what he
calls Perelman's "humanistic idealism" (he makes this sound like an epithet in
the paragraph in which this phrase appears): "The major barrier to restoring

rhetoric to intellectual respectability has been its history of troubled association
with relativism...the price of Perelman's 'freedom' could be the utter loss of
standards, fixed principles, and other forms of authority (36)."
The major difficulty with Gaskins' analysis of Perelman's theory is that he
concerns himself only with a very abstract version of Perelman's argument--one
he finds in the last paragraph of The New Rhetoric. Here is the passage:
Only the existence of an argumentation that is neither compelling
nor arbitrary can give meaning to human freedom, a state in which
a reasonable choice can be exercised. If freedom was no more
than necessary adherence to a previously given natural order, it
would exclude all possibility of choice; and if the exercise of
freedom were not based on reasons, every choice would be
irrational and would be reduced to an arbitrary decision operating
in an intellectual void. It is because of the possibility of
argumentation which provides reasons, but not compelling
reasons, that it is possible to escape the dilemma: adherence to
an objectively and universally valid truth, or recourse to suggestion
and violence to secure acceptance for our opinions and decisions.
The theory of argumentation will help to develop what a logic of
value judgments has tried in vain to provide, namely the justification
of the possibility of a human community in the sphere of action
when this justification cannot be based on a reality or objective truth
(quoted in Gaskins 31-32).
And here is the next sentence, the final sentence in The New Rhetoric, the one
that Gaskins leaves out: "And its starting point, in making this contribution, is
an analysis of those forms of reasoning which, though they are indispensable
in practice, have from the time of Descartes been neglected by logicians and
theoreticians of knowledge" (TNR 514). Remember this sentence; I will return
to it shortly.
Gaskins judges this passage and in fact the entire project of The New Rhetoric
as follows:
As a subtle example of argumentation in its own right, based
entirely on affirmative inferences from negative assertions, this
passage illustrates a central paradox in Perelman's approach. It all
boils down to a hypothetical proposition, using an argument form
strangely absent from Perelman's compendium: if formal models of
reasoning lead to abhorrent practical results, then the new
rhetorical model must be embraced as a valid alternative (32).
Now if this were what Perelman's argument "boils down to" then he wouldn't
have had to team up with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca and they wouldn't have had to
write The New Rhetoric, which includes, in addition to the last paragraph, 500+
pages of framework and starting points theory and, of course, a very large
argument by example that includes an analysis of around 50 distinct

techniques of argumentation. This analysis, say Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca explicitly in the very last sentence of their treatise, is the starting point
for the justification of the possibility of free human community in the sphere of
action when certainty is not available.
However, this does not stop Gaskins from pursuing his straw rhetorician. To
continue the earlier passage:
One could respond to [Perelman's] eloquent plea by asking
whether Perelman's model of rhetoric--in addition to being
something useful and inspirational--is also valid, true, correct or
rational. But from Perelman's point of view this question misses the
purpose of the whole rhetorical enterprise: to liberate us from all
such inaccessible criteria of categorical judgment…But even more
important, the new rhetoric has not even prevailed according to its
own rhetorical standards. Some permissive spirit or contingent
license is necessary to keep it alive as an option for further
deliberation. In short, something like a presumption of validity-untilproven-false haunts Perelman's basic argument…Perelman's
move follows the grand strategy of shifting the burden of proof.
Whereas for centuries the onus weighed heavily on would-be
challengers to formal logic, Perelman's argument reverses that
presumption (32-33).
There are two kinds of difficulty in Gaskins' critique of Perelman. First, there is
a problem with Gaskins' concept of burden of proof and with the argumentative
strategy he employs. Second, there is a related problem with his
understanding of Perelman's rhetorical theory. Gaskins' concept of burden of
proof goes way beyond any usual account of what the term means. For
Gaskins, it does not have to do directly with what standards of proof must be
met by arguers. Neither does it have to do, at bottom, with who shoulders the
burden of having to argue, or with what party the presumption rests. Instead, as
he says, "Among the many dialectical functions performed by the courts, I have
singled out their administration of burdens of proof. By purposely expanding
this concept beyond the set of technical rules found under that label in the
major textbooks on legal evidence, I mean to include the entire range of
practices by which courts gain control over indeterminate questions of fact and
value" (37). Gaskins develops this expanded concept and then carries it well
beyond the courts, finding in public discourse in general and in theories of
reason especially many different kinds of attempt to "gain control over
indeterminate questions of fact and value."
However, if any attempt to "gain control" over these questions in conditions of
uncertainty is taken to be burden-shifting, then the entire sphere of
argumentation The New Rhetoric analyzes and out of which it argues is going
to be a sphere of burden-shifting. The charge might be half-plausible if one
reduced The New Rhetoric to a truncated and abstract version of one of its
arguments--as Gaskins does in his citation of the book's last paragraph.

However, it is much less plausible if one acknowledges that Gaskins' charge is
just what The New Rhetoric's many examples of techniques of argumentation
are there to refute--that people can resort only to irrational burden-shifting
struggles when there are not established procedures for achieving finality in
argumentation. The New Rhetoric's many examples show that people really do
"gain control" of questions of fact and value even when such matters cannot be
determined with certainty. Gaskins' wildly expanded notion of burden of proof
makes the real argument impossible to join. From Gaskins' viewpoint,
Perelman's account of how we reason in conditions of uncertainty can be
about nothing more than, and can itself be nothing more than, burden shifting.
Again, as long as one doesn't look at The New Rhetoric's real argument, in its
detail, one can make this argument seem half-plausible.
The other difficulty with Gaskins' approach is that he misunderstands The New
Rhetoric's argument fairly completely. He believes that Perelman is trying to
model and ground his theory of argumentation on juridical procedures whose
complexities he misunderstands. He misses the fact that The New Rhetoric is
finally grounded in a concept of justice, not the procedures of law. Gaskins
believes that The New Rhetoric's argument is negative, an argument about the
inability of formal theories to account for reasoning, and so ignores the real
substance of Perelman's case. And Gaskins believes that Perelman's
discussion of presumptions in his account of how specialized audiences
reason exhausts what he has to say about the matter. In order to show far
wrong Gaskins has gone, it's going to be necessary to show what The New
Rhetoric's real account of these matters is.
4. Inertia and Reason in The New Rhetoric
At critical junctures in The New Rhetoric, the authors resort to naturalistic
metaphors. No juncture is more critical than when they formulate the concept of
"inertia." Inertia is the foundation of the rule of justice (218-219), which is in the
end itself the measure of the strength of arguments--Perelman's version of a
validity criterion. How is it that inertia is the foundation of justice and reason?
What strange trick allows a treatise devoted to reason and freedom to rest
finally on a metaphor relating to a force of physics? It's an interesting story, and
one that puts the issues of burden and presumption in a remarkable light.
The discussion of inertia takes place in part two of The New Rhetoric, which is
concerned with the starting points of argumentation--i.e. with a background that
must be in place for argumentation to proceed. Part of this background is fixed
and is not arguable: facts and truths, for example. Part of it is fixed for
particular audiences but not for others--values and hierarchies, for example.
Presumptions occupy an interesting in-between place--they enjoy a universal
acknowledgment, but adherence to them, although universal, is not always
certain or fast. And so adherence to presumptions can be strengthened or
weakened by way of argumentation. Presumptions usually regard what is likely
or probable--for example the presumption that other people are telling us the
truth. We usually have to have reasons to doubt what others say; the

presumption lies on the side of truthfulness. Of course, there are times when
this presumption's power can be drastically reduced by arguments to the
contrary--usually by arguments that point out what is not normal about the
situation in which the presumption might be made or that call the underlying
assumption about what is normal into question. Perelman mentions other
common presumptions in this section: the presumption that actions reveal the
character of the person, the presumption that what is said to us is somehow of
interest to us, the presumption that actions can be understood and explained.
Such presumptions about what is normal rest, says Perelman, on a reference
group of normal people. Such presumptions are both universally held--and they
can be strengthened and weakened by argumentation.
We can easily see why Gaskins might focus on the weakening and even
collapse of presumption as a signal indicator of social dissolution, the decline
of reason, and the cause of adversarial eristics. Much reasoning--especially in
law--depends on what one can reasonably take for granted about human
behavior. The more agreement about this, the easier to proceed with
argumentation; the less agreement, the more burdens and presumptions
become matters of argument themselves. Think of the presumptions of
heterosexuality and of able-bodiedness and of the social conflict around
whether these presumptions are warranted--which is, as Perelman points out-conflict about who is in the reference group from which the concept of the
normal is derived.
However, what is most interesting about presumption in Perelman is that it is
thought of as analogous to a natural phenomenon. Presuming is not simply an
action we take but a condition for life and reason. Here is one of the critical
passages: "In most cases…a speaker has no firmer support for his
presumptions than psychical and social inertia which are the equivalent in
consciousness and society of the inertia of physics" (TNR 105). This is a
remarkable equivalency, since inertia has a place of such primacy in physics.
Inertia is responsible in a profound way for what regularity and order there are
in physics--for the intelligibility of the physical world. Perelman is claiming that
there is something like this same force operating to give reason and society
what order and intelligibility they have as well. Sustaining presumption is this
primary inertial force. This view of a natural force operating in reason is worlds
away from Gaskins' conclusion about the arbitrariness of presumption in
Perelman's account of reasoning. Here is Gaskins: "It is not surprising that
Perelman treats presumptions as isolated parochialisms, rather than as broad
cognitive or strategic forces. For him presumptions are simply localized biases
or prejudices, characteristic of discrete groups but certainly not binding on the
community as a whole" (34).
However, let me quote Perelman on inertia a little further:
It can be presumed, failing proof to the contrary, that the attitude
previously adopted--the opinion expressed, the behavior preferred-will continue in the future…According to Paulhan, the strange thing

about our condition is that it is 'easy to find reasons for strange
acts, but difficult to find them for ordinary acts. A man who eats
beef does not know why, but if he gives up beef forever in favor of
frogs or salsify he will think up a thousand proofs, each more
ingenious than the last.' Inertia makes it possible to rely on the
normal, the habitual, the real, and the actual and to attach a value to
them, whether it is a matter of an existing situation, an accepted
opinion, or a state of regular and continuous development. Change,
on the other hand, has to be justified…"(TNR 105-6).
In short, those who advocate for change bear the burden of proof. There is a
host of issues to be explored in this passage. The world of the fact/value
distinction is completely overcome here by the way inertia attaches a value to
the real, the actual, the normal, the habitual. This means, as Perelman shrewdly
notes, that change has a "devaluating effect." It "shakes social confidence"
because inertia grants a value to the way things are (TNR 106).
However, the most important move in Perelman's account is where the
psychical and social force of inertia takes on a property not shared by the
physical world. In physics, inertia is a force that is continuous in space and
time; it is not translated over breaks in time or space. In reason and society,
matters are different:
It is through inertia that the technique of the closed case is
extended, so to speak, into the technique of the precedent. The
only difference between the repetition of a precedent and the
continuance of an existing state is that in the former the facts are
seen as discontinuous. With this very small shift in perspective, we
can still see inertia at work: it is as necessary to prove the
expediency of changing behavior when confronted with the
repetition of a situation as it is to prove the utility of changing an
existing state of affairs" (TNR 107).
This is an insightful account, but I am not convinced by Perelman that this is a
small shift in perspective. For it is the power of discontinuity in the working of
inertia that allows for the force of precedence to take hold, and this is directly
connected to the relation between inertia and justice, as we shall see.
One reaches The New Rhetoric's center of gravity at a remarkable passage
on the strength of arguments. The passage occurs in the middle of a section
titled "Interaction and Strength of Arguments," in which an essential identity of
reason and justice is highlighted (TNR 460-65). Perelman and OlbrechtsTyteca note that the strength of arguments is not something that can be
measured psychologically or through social-scientific research. Rather, the
idea of the strength of arguments is created by a distinction between two
viewpoints--the normal (or usual) and the norm (the normative). This distinction
allows the dissociation of validity from effectiveness. Effective arguments may
be effective without really being strong; they are effective with some audience
as a matter of fact. Valid arguments are strong ones; they have their strength

not de facto but de jure.
According to The New Rhetoric, there is no logical ground for this whole
framework of distinctions. Rather: "The normal, as well as the norm, is
definable only in relation to an audience whose reactions provide the measure
of normality and whose adherence is the foundation for standards of
value...The superiority of the norm over the normal is correlative to the
superiority of one audience over another" (463).
One might imagine, then, that The New Rhetoric would just stop the analysis
there, and refer back to the earlier famous discussion of the universal
audience. However, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca go further in this section.
They repeat the question, as if they were starting the analysis again: "What
guarantees this validity? What provides the criterion for it?" (464) I take it that
they are asking, What is the criterion by which a universal audience recognizes
the strength of arguments?
Now, this is a strange question for them to ask. Earlier in the book, they
developed a highly relativized concept of the universal audience. As they say,
"Everyone constitutes the universal audience from what he knows of his fellow
men, in such a way as to transcend the few oppositions he is aware of. Each
individual, each culture, has thus its own conception of the universal audience"
(33). However, here they say: "Our hypothesis is that ... strength is appraised
by application of the rule of justice: that which was capable of convincing in a
specific situation will appear to be convincing in a similar or analogous
situation" (464).
In some respects, this section just repeats and elaborates on ideas that have
been developed elsewhere. However, there is, I think, something new here.
This is the only passage I know of in The New Rhetoric in which the universal
audience is identified with a particular argumentative technique--here, the
application of the rule of justice. If this is so, then the rule of justice has a unique
status in the theory. In fact, since it is the rule of justice that allows a universal
audience to judge the strength of arguments, we are justified in concluding that
the idea of justice lies at the core of Perelman's philosophy of argumentation.
The quasi-natural force of inertia grounds presumption in its most fundamental
form: change must be justified. However, inertia as The New Rhetoric
conceptualizes it is also capable of supporting a more far-reaching
presumption of justice--that a change that violates precedent must be justified,
and more generally that precedents can be used in arguments. Here one
glimpses the ethical heart of The New Rhetoric's project. The presumption of
justice is a presumption of equity, and the rule of justice is the rational means
by which equity is protected.
In its abstract form the rule of justice states that people in similar situations
should be treated similarly, that situations that are alike should be treated alike.
A teen-aged brother and sister murder their father. The rule of justice says that

we should treat this murder like any other murder. However, we can argue that
the act and situation are not similar to most murders. The teenagers are young.
Their action came only after years of violent abuse by the father. The children
had reason to fear imminent violent actions, and so on. Without the
presumption of the rule of justice, supported by inertia, none of these
arguments would be available.
However, Perelman knew early on that the formal rule of justice was not
sufficient to make this presumption of equity concrete enough to reach
decisions in difficult cases. People would always argue about whether actions
or situations were relevantly similar. In his positivist phase, he had attempted to
solve this problem abstractly and formally, through conceptual analysis.
However, this led him to a famous impasse. The only way to reach conclusions
about real cases was to make value judgments about the concrete details of
cases: young people should be treated differently from adults in criminal cases.
At a certain level of suffering from violence preventive counter-violence is
justified, and so on. But Perelman despaired of being able to justify these
kinds of statements philosophically. From the positivist position, the question
is: How can one, without belonging to any tradition, without acknowledging any
precedents, without adhering to any values, ground those value judgments
which would complete the task of constructing a rational theory of justice?
Perelman's answer to this question is not simply that one can't. His response is
that the question betrays deep misunderstandings about what reasoning is,
deep misunderstandings about what makes the question itself possible. The
question is analogous to asking someone to build a house simply by thinking
about it, without using any of the available materials that have been used to
construct any houses that actually exist.
The principle of inertia puts the philosopher of reason back into the world, a
world rich with precedents, full of decisions that have actually been made, a
world ordered already by substantive decisions about when actions and
situations are and are not alike. This is true not only of juridical matters, in
which laws and customs and regulations are assumed to be just by the mere
fact of their existence, but it is true, too, of the way past decisions and
judgments within families and friendships and organizations work by inertially
powered presumptions of equity to make reasoning possible in accord with the
rule of justice.

5. The Argument of The New Rhetoric
However, not only does presumption play this central role within the theory of
argumentation that The New Rhetoric offers; it also plays a central role in The
New Rhetoric's own basic argument. Recall that Gaskins charged that The
New Rhetoric's argument was primarily an argument from ignorance, one
based on inferences from negative assertions--since formal logic cannot solve
practical problems of reasoning, then rhetoric is the right approach. Since

dogmatism and skepticism have intolerable practical consequences, we
should follow the path of the rhetorical tradition to return to reason. These are
simply not Perelman's main arguments. Rather, he takes the limits of formal
reasoning and the undesirability of skepticism and dogmatism as givens. They
occupy him only for a short time at the beginning of his treatise as a way of
accounting for the motivations of The New Rhetoric. The real question is: given
the limitations of formal logic and the undesirable consequences of dogmatism
and skepticism--all fully evident in the postwar milieu out of which Perelman
wrote--what is the alternative? Is there an alternative? The burden of argument
in The New Rhetoric is showing that there is such an alternative.
But how does the argument proceed? Does Perelman use a strategy for which
he himself cannot account, as Gaskins charges? Perelman set out to answer a
question which was formulated within a positivist framework: how can one
justify value judgments by starting from a position in which one is strictly
uncommitted to any values? Is it possible to develop or discover a logic of
value judgments which would allow assertions of value to be logically justified?
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca failed to discover such a logic, and Perelman
abandoned the question. This, I think, is the critical moment in Perelman's
intellectual development, for Perelman is abandoning not simply a question,
but an argumentative community, a conception of which people share his basic
aspirations--his judgment about which facts are important, which values
deserve our adherence, who the universal audience really is. In the early part of
his career, his argumentative community was made up of logicians and
philosophers--people committed to universality in a very strict way, but people
who tried to position themselves as thinkers, outside of any tradition, apart
from common sense and everyday practices, people who would construct the
world rationally, from the ground up. I believe that Perelman shared their
aspiration for universality because he saw the achievement of this universality
as the primary alternative to violence. The renunciation of violence and the
desire for peace were, I think, his most consistent principles and desires.
However, he came to abandon this community because it achieved what
universality it did, what non-violence it did, only at the cost of forsaking any
reasoning about those issues concerning which human beings really do come
to violence.
It is significant, I think, that Perelman's 1945 positivist essay, De La Justice,
which runs 60 pages in its English translation, contains references to only 8
other writers, and a few more titles. The only citation which is more than 15
years old is to Proudhon--1868. Except for one reference to C.L. Stevenson
and one to a German writer, they are all to French language writers. In the first
60 pages of The New Rhetoric, we find 116 citations--Descartes, Mill, Pascal,
Leibniz, Whately, Aristotle, Plato, Hollingworth, Lewis Carrol, Cassirer, Bacon,
Bruner, Cicero, Quintilian, Sterne, Vico, Demosthenes, Petronius, Husserl-and these are not even all the names from the notes on the first 26 pages.
Neither are those the most citation-dense pages of the book--those lie in part
three, where the reasoning is almost strictly by example, and where there are
244 notes in the second chapter alone.

The New Rhetoric is a very different kind of work from De La Justice--but that
is the point. It is not an accident that the book argues by example. Perelman is
not simply in search of techniques of reasoning which can be described in a
quasi-formal way and presented as parts of a discursive system. He is in
search of new fellow-aspirants--a tradition in which the renunciation of violence
and the aspiration for an expansive, inclusive human community--the aspiration
for universality--is real. Remember that for Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca,
argument by example is used not simply to clarify or support a pre-existing
assertion; that is the role of illustrations. Rather, examples are used to
establish a rule. The wealth of examples in The New Rhetoric is meant to
establish the entire case. The examples as a whole represent the community to
which Perelman turned when he abandoned the positivist question. The
argument of The New Rhetoric is that a concrete tradition of reasoning about
difficult practical issues already surrounds us, that it is an orderly tradition, and
its framework and starting points and techniques of argumentation can be
understood.
Perelman came to reject the claim that the rule of justice could not be applied
since precedents could not be justified. He came to see that the audience that
believed that there were no precedents, no already existing agreements about
values, was something of a chimera, a figment of the imaginations of a
community which misunderstood itself--in other words, a view to which only a
very particular and rather peculiar audience would adhere. And he projected
himself into a community in which there was a rich store of values and
precedents. His discovery was that there was a profound history of people who
shared his aspiration for universality and his rejection of violence. It became for
Perelman a fact that people simply do often settle their disputes non-violently,
through reasoning. They do succeed in coming together by way of a common
conception of what is good for human beings.
And the fact became that there was also a trans-cultural, trans-historical
tradition of people who tried to account for how this happens--and who aspired
for agreement with one another, too. Both of these groups serve as Perelman's
examples in The New Rhetoric; they are representatives of a community of
aspirers: people who aspire to human solidarity in small and large ways,
people who understand reasoning as a branch of justice, a domain in which
utterances are treated fairly. The real story is that Perelman decided to keep
company with these new interlocutors, to join them in an inertial frame of
reference, to attempt to win for them the presumption.
Considered from a very general point of view, one might charge that
Perelman's overall argument is circular. He set out to develop a concept of
justice, but it failed because of its formality, its inability to decide concrete
cases without issuing in valuing judgments. However, he finds in the quasinatural fact of inertia a grounding for presumption and for the rule of justice,
which underlies our ability to measure the strength of arguments, to distinguish
between mere effectiveness ands genuine rational strength. Inertia also
guarantees the legitimacy of precedents, their continuing inertial force even

over discontinuities of space and time, in the special time of social memory, or
the memory of a moral or rational community. That is, judgments about justice
are possible only because some community already knows what justice is,
already has precedents that allow presumption to function.
Our judgment about whether Perelman's circular reasoning is vicious or not,
would, if we accepted his own account, be based on a judgment about whether
the circle was drawn widely enough, whether the argumentative community for
which he abandoned positivism is inclusive enough, whether it can answer the
objections that might be made about its exclusiveness, whether we can
ourselves aspire to some solidarity with it. The particular character of The New
Rhetoric's aspiration to solidarity, its particular conception of the universal
audience, may be found in its examples. They establish the case. If they are
taken to represent a narrow range of interests, then one will see the circle from
the theory of justice to The New Rhetoric and back as a vicious one. I think
Perelman would admit that he is aligning himself in a strong way with a
community that aspires to human solidarity and hopes progressively to
eliminate violence from human relations. That is, his defense of his intellectual
work would rest on ethical grounds. In the end, then the most serious criticism
one could make of Perelman’s career and his writings would be that he had
misjudged the aspirations of that community with which he allied himself.
However, in my judgment, the burden of proof would rest with the one who
makes that charge--not because Perelman has succeeded in irrationally
shifting the burden during a period of social dissolution--as Gaskins might
suggest--but because he has collected and successfully given an account of a
convincing number of argumentative techniques that have in fact allowed
people to avoid violence and dogmatism in settling conflicts.
One difficulty with which Perelman concerned himself after The New Rhetoric
was not giving presumption its proper due, as Gaskins would recommend, but
the opposite: trying to explain how in the presence of the powerful inertia that
governs reason it is possible to believe that one can ever move beyond the
conservatism and what Perelman regarded as the sometimes unjust force of
inertia. In the 1964 Genoa lectures, in the lecture on "Justice and Justification,"
he asks: "Is it possible in the practical realm to transcend the aspirations of a
political community?" (Perelman 1967: 70)
In the concluding Genoa lecture, on "Justice and Reason," Perelman connects
this question to the question of whether or not there is such a thing as a
philosopher's mission--that is, whether it is possible to reason convincingly in a
way that goes beyond simply reaffirming presumptions. Perelman draws his
conception of philosophy from Husserl, the Husserl who wrote that
"philosophers are the civil servants of humanity." Legislators and judges have
to make and apply law in a way that conforms to the presumptions of the
political community, but philosophers, says Perelman, must formulate just laws
and judge according to those laws not for a given society or group but for the
whole of humanity. This puts enormous strains on Perelman's central concepts
of universality, inertia and justice, but these are just the matters that Perelman

judged to need addressing after finishing The New Rhetoric, in which the
concepts of inertia, presumption and precedent play such significant roles.
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